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Abstract
Part I of this Note introduces the problem of removal of non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS in
the United States to countries where treatment is unavailable, and discusses case law in which the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have rec-
ognized a protection from removal that would terminate HIV/AIDS treatment. Part II examines the
US domestic legal protections potentially available to non-US citizens in the United States whose
removal will terminate their HIV/AIDS treatment, as well as the application of each of these legal
protections to those with HIV/AIDS contesting deportation to countries lacking adequate access
to HIV/AIDS treatment. Part III argues that while legal protections available to non-US citizens
in this situation have proven inadequate, the United States may expand US domestic law to pro-
hibit removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment. The United States may also apply the American
Declaration consistently with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights case law, or recog-
nize a customary international law that compels their protection under the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment or treatment.
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INTRODUCTION
Millions of individuals worldwide struggle with human
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") in an epidemic that
continues to present global economic and health problems as
well as legal issues.' Some governments strive to provide sufferers
with the best possible access to treatment.2 Scholars have
discussed the international legal right of persons with HIV/AIDS
to have access to life-sustaining medical treatment.3 A sub-topic of
this discussion is the assertion of a legal right of persons with
HIV/AIDS who presently have access to such medical treatment,
but who are subject to a state order of deportation to a country
where such treatment is unavailable.4 Although this right applies
to very specific circumstances, and few deportees have invoked it
in either international or US domestic courts, the issue of
whether such a right exists is monumental because of the stakes
involved.5 Non-US citizens seeking legal protection from removal
1. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text (discussing the human
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS")
epidemic, resulting problems, and US and UK aid efforts).
2. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing US efforts to provide
treatment for HIV/AIDS abroad); see also notes 33-40 and accompanying text
(discussing the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the limited access to treatment in parts of the
world, and efforts by governnents to expand access to treatment).
3. See, e.g., Noah Novogrodsky, The Duty of Treatment: Human Rights and the
HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 15 (2009) (examining how a
human right to HIV/AIDS treatment emerged in international law, with domestic law at
the locus of the right); Ellen M. Walker, The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Human Rights: A
Continuum Approach, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 335, 388-418 (2007) (suggesting ways in which
international human rights laws may address challenges arising under the HIV/AIDS
pandemic). The Center for Disease Control defines AIDS as including "all HIV-infected
persons who have less than 200 CD4+ T-lymphocytes/uL or a CD4+ T-lymphocyte
percent of total lymphocytes of less than 14." Ctrs. for Disease Control, 1993 Revised
Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS
Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 961, 961 (1992).
4. See, e.g., KATHERINE WILTENBURG TODRYS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RETURNED
TO RISK: DEPORTATION OF HIV-P'OSITIVE MIGRANTS 1, 13-26 (Rebecca Schleifer &
Joseph Amon eds., 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/09/2 4 /
returned-risk (describing the problem of removal of non-citizens with HIV/AIDS in
several countries, and making recommendations); Ruly Tafzil, Note, HIV-Based Claims for
Protection in the U.S. and the UK., 33 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 517-54 (2010)
(discussing cases in which non-citizens in the United States and the United Kingdom
attempted to avoid deportation based on their HIV/AIDS status, the circumstances
surrounding some of those cases, and their degrees of success).
5. See infra Parts I. and II. (discussing claims in international and domestic case law,
which contest removal that would terminate HIV/AIDS treatment).
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that would terminate their HIV/AIDS treatment claim that
removal would constitute a death sentence.6 Nonetheless, as
demonstrated in both international and US domestic
jurisprudence, protection from life-threatening removal under
these circumstances is usually very limited where it exists at all.7
In the United States, the issue of whether there exists a legal
protection from removal that would terminate HIV/AIDS
treatment has played out in a series of cases under US domestic
law." Non-US citizens have, on various grounds, contested their
removal under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution.9 All US Courts of
Appeals, however, have held that the Eighth Amendment is
inapplicable to deportation proceedings because, as the US
Supreme Court has held, deportation does not constitute
punishment for a crime.' 0 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the
6. See infra note 27 (noting cases in which the petitioner claimed her removal
amounted to a death sentence); see also infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text
(implying that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that Mortlock's
removal amounted to a death sentence).
7. See infra Part I.C-E. (discussing protections from removal terminating
HIV/AIDS treatment in three cases before international courts); Part II. (discussing US
domestic protections from removal as applied to removal terminating HIV/AIDS
treatment).
8. See infra Part II. (discussing US domestic case law as applied to removal
terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); see infra note 10 (citing
cases in which non-US citizens have contested their removal under the Eighth
Amendment to the US Constitution).
10. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984) (holding that the
purpose of deportation is to put an end to violation of immigration laws, not to punish
past transgressions, and, accordingly, "various protections that apply in the context of a
criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ("The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime....
It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not
complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the
nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments,
has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend."); see, e.g., Mayne v.
Att'y Gen., 392 F. App'x 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that deportation is a civil matter,
and therefore, may not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause); Zamora-
Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 695 (7th Cir. 2008); Stewart v. Gonzales, 247 F. App'x
438, 440 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment does not apply to deportation and
removal proceedings."); Elia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 276 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the cruel and unusual punishment clause tinder the Eighth Amendment is
inapplicable to deportation proceedings because "the Supreme Court has held, [that]
deportation does not constitute punishment"); LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 1370
(9th Cir. 1976) (holding that deportation is "not cruel and unusual punishment under
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US Supreme Court held that a deportation order is not
punishment for a crime, but rather a method of enforcing
immigration law by returning a non-citizen who has not complied
with immigration law to his or her home country." Thus, non-US
citizens in general, and those with HIV/AIDS whose removal will
terminate their HIV/AIDS treatment, must invoke one of several
US domestic laws: asylum, withholding of removal, and the law
enacting the United Nations Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("CAT").12
In some cases, courts have recognized that deportation
terminating HIV/AIDS treatment violates domestic asylum law in
the United States, which prohibits removal where a non-US
citizen has a well-founded fear of persecution based on
membership in a suspect category, such as people living with
HIV/AIDS.13 In other cases, courts have reasoned that
deportation would be illegitimate under the rubric of
withholding of removal, which implements US obligations under
the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention") through Section 241(b) (3) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). 4 Withholding
removal countermands deportation that would result in threats
to life or freedom because of membership in a suspect category.' 5
the Eighth Amendment even though the penalty may be severe"); Oliver v. INS, 517
F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that deportation is "classified as a civil rather than
a criminal procedure"); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1977) ("In
the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions
outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no
difliculty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable. Thus, in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court held the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the
deportation of aliens on the ground that 'deportation is not a punishment for crime."').
11. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
12. See infra Part II. (discussing the legal protections under US domestic law).
13. See infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text (discussing asylum law and cases
in which courts have considered asylum claims of non-citizens with HIV/AIDS).
14. See Anwen Hughes, Human Rights First, Asylum and Withholding of Removal-A
Brief Overview of the Substantive Law, 195 PRAC. L. INST. 227, 253 (2010) ("Withholding of
removal tinder INA § 241 (b)(3) implements U.S. obligations of non-refoulement under
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention."); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M.
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AN) REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 893 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2009) ("[T]he Refugee Act of' 1980 brought United States statutory law into
conformity with the [Refugee] Convention.").
15. See infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text (discussing case law in which
courts have considered withholding claims of non-citizens with HIV/AIDS).
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Still, other cases have suggested that deportation under these
circumstances would constitute torture, which is prohibited
under international law by CAT and under US domestic law that
enacted CAT. 16
As this Note demonstrates, asylum, withholding, and the law
enacting CAT are limited in their applications to people living
with HIV/AIDS in the United States who would lose access to
medical treatment if removed. 7 Asylum requires persecution, a
standard which lack of medical care has generally failed to
meet.18 Withholding requires that the government deliberately
deny access to necessary amenities, while the law enacting CAT
requires intentionally-inflicted torture.' US federal case law has
demonstrated that asylum, withholding of removal, and the law
enacting CAT are too narrow to protect non-US citizens from
removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment.20
In order to protect non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS from
removal that will terminate treatment, the United States must
either broaden US domestic law or invoke international law.2'
Under domestic law, the United States may expand the laws of
asylum or withholding, or the law enacting CAT, to protect non-
US citizens from removal that will terminate HIV/AIDS
treatment.22 Under international law, the United States may
apply the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
16. See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text (describing the United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("CAT") and its application to cases of non-citizens with HIV/AIDS).
17. See infra Part 11. (discussing US domestic legal protections from removal); Part
III.A. (arguing that these protections are inadequate in protecting non-US citizens from
removal that will terminate HIV/AlDS treatment).
18. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing two cases in which
courts denied the asylum claims of non-citizens with HIV/AlDS based on lost access to
medical care because they failed to demonstrate persecution).
19. See infra notes 168-81 (describing the requirements of withholding that have
limited this protection as applied to cases of non-citizens with HIV/AIDS, as well as an
exceptional case); see also infra Part 11.1). (discussing the intent requirement of claims
under the law implementing CAT).
20. See infra Parts II-lI.A. (discussing asylum, withholding, and the law enacting
CAT in the United States as applied to the removal of non-citizens with HIV/AIDS who
face losing access to medical treatment if removed).
21. See infra Part ILI.B-C. (discussing the broadening of US domestic law to
recognize protection from removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment, and solutions
invoking international law).
22. See infra Part III.B. (discussing potential US domestic protections from removal
terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
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("American Declaration") consistently with the jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.2 3 The United
States may also recognize a protection under customary
international law based on a conception that has already forged
the holdings of two regional human rights courts-the European
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights-in which people with HIV/AIDS have
successfully challenged deportation.24 This conception is that
deporting a person with HIV/AIDS to a country where they will
not have access to life-sustaining medical treatment constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment or treatment. 25 By recognizing an
emerging customary international norm, US policymakers and
US federal courts may protect the lives of non-citizens with
HIV/AIDS facing removal from the United States. 26 This norm
may, but need not, entail recognizing deportation under these
circumstances as cruel or unusual punishment or treatment,
which is independent of the ideas of asylum, torture, or
withholding, because of a threat to life or dignity if deportation is
carried out.2 7
23. See infra note 231 and accompanying text (recommending US ratification of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man ("American Declaration")).
24. See infra Part I.C-E. (discussing case law in which the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights protected non-
citizens with HIV/AIDS from removal based on lack of medical care in their home
countries).
25. See infra Parts IC., I.E. (summarizing cases in which international courts held
that removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment constituted cruel and unusual
punishment). Some articles have discussed deportation in general as a category of
punishment. See, e.g., Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least
Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305,
307-08 (2000) (arguing that the US Supreme Court's holding that deportation is not
punishment is "not particularly compelling"); Lisa Mendel, Note, The Court's Failure to
Recognize Deportation as Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 205, 221-23 (2000) (challenging the US Supreme Court's position
that deportation is not punishment for a crime, but not in the specific context of
HIV/AIDS).
26. See infra Part I.C-E. (discussing international case law); see also infra Part III.C.
(discussing an emerging customary international law).
27. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (characterizing the right to die with
dignity as a right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment); see also infra Part
II.B-D. (describing asylum, withholding, and CAT in the context of removal terminating
HIV/AIDS treatment). Some articles have discussed deportation as punishment in
general, but not within the context of losing HIV/AIDS treatment. See supra note 25; see
also infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (analytically distinguishing recognition of
deportation in general as punishment, and recognition of deportation which terminates
HIV/AIDS treatment as punishment); infra Part III.B-C. (arguing that the United States
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Part I of this Note introduces the problem of removal of
non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS in the United States to countries
where treatment is unavailable, and discusses case law in which
the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights have recognized a protection
from removal that would terminate HIV/AIDS treatment. Part II
examines the US domestic legal protections potentially available
to non-US citizens in the United States whose removal will
terminate their HIV/AIDS treatment, as well as the application of
each of these legal protections to those with HIV/AIDS
contesting deportation to countries lacking adequate access to
HIV/AIDS treatment. Part III argues that while legal protections
available to non-US citizens in this situation have proven
inadequate, the United States may expand US domestic law to
prohibit removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment. The United
States may also apply the American Declaration consistently with
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights case law, or
recognize a customary international law that compels their
protection under the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment or treatment.
I. REMOVAL OF NON-CITIZENS WITH HIV/AIDS AND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Despite recognizing the deleterious effects of HIV/AIDS
and the potentially positive impact of treatment on individuals
with HIV/AIDS, the United States may, in accordance with
domestic law, deport non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS to
countries where they will lose access to such treatment.28 In the
should recognize a protection from removal under the rubric of cruel and unusual
punishment or treatment). Some litigants have adopted this approach as well. See, e.g.,
Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2008) ("In short, Bosede argued that a
return to Nigeria was akin to a death scntence."); Andrea Mortlock, Case 12.534, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/08, 74 (2008), available at http://www.
cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008cng/USAI 2534eng.htm ("The Petitioners further argue
that Ms. Mortlock has become increasingly sick and listless to the extent that removal by
the United States would be nothing short ofa death sentence.").
28. See Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
http://www.who.int/hiv/data/2009_global summary.png (last visited Aug. 22, 2011)
(describing the death toll of the HIV/AIDS epidemic); infra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text (discussing HIV/AIDS treatment and efforts to make treatment
more available); see also infra note 41 (naming countries that deport non-citizens despite
their HIV/AIDS status).
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United States and abroad, international bodies have prohibited
removal in these circumstances under international law.29
Customary international law compels scrutiny of this trend and
consideration of the impact it may or should have on US
domestic jurisprudence.30 Section A of this Part first describes the
current status of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the problems
presented by removal of persons with HIV/AIDS. It then
introduces two international bodies that have recognized a legal
protection from removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment: the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Section B discusses the two
international documents under which these bodies found relief
from removal for non-citizens with HIV/AIDS, namely, the
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 ("European
Convention"), and the American Declaration. Sections C and D
examine D. v. United Kingdom and N. v. United Kingdom, two cases
in which the European Court of Human Rights recognized a
legal protection from removal that terminates HIV/AIDS
treatment. Last, Section E discusses an Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights case, Andrea Mortlock, which
recognized a protection from removal for an HIV-positive non-
US citizen living in the United States.
A. The HIV/AIDS Epidemic
The HIV/AIDS epidemic stands out among public health
problems not only because it claims millions of lives annually and
presents a long-standing challenge in making treatment
available, but also because it creates a crippling stigma for those
it afflicts.-' HIV/AIDS has detrimental physical effects on
sufferers.32 The World Health Organization reports that 1.8
million people died of AIDS-related illnesses in 2009.33
29. See infra Part I.l-C. (describing document provisions under which courts have
protected people with HIV/AIDS from removal, and related case law).
30. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the role of customary
international law in US federal jurisprudence).
31. See infra note 35 (discussing discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS).
32. See Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra
note 28 (quantifying annual AIDS-related casualties worldwide).
33. See Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra
note 31 (providing statistics on HIV/AIDS-related Fatalities); HIV Surveillance, Estimates,
Monitoring and Evaluation, WORL) HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 28 (explaining
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HIV/AIDS is economically detrimental both at household and
national levels.34 Widespread discrimination also threatens those
with HIV/AIDS in many parts of the world.35
Treatment significantly improves the quality and length of
life for individuals living with HIV/AIDS.3 6 Treatment also
decreases the visibility of symptoms, providing a check against
some discrimination.37 Unfortunately, HIV/AIDS treatment is
largely unavailable in many countries. According to a report by
the World Health Organization, as of December 2009, fewer than
half of the people in many low- and middle-income countries
that the World Health Organization uses various sources of data, including household
surveys and collaboration with national AIDS programs, to regularly publish country and
global updates on HIV/AIDS conditions).
34. See Belinda Beresford, AIDS Takes an Economic and Social Toll, 15 AFRIcA
RECOVERY 19, 21-22 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/ccosocdev/geninfo/afrec/
voll5nol/15nolpdf/151aids9.pdf ("[T]he devastation of AIDS among individuals and
families ultimately affects a country's overall economic performance. The loss of
experienced workers and skilled professionals saps production in key sectors."); john
Stover & Lori Bollinger, The Economic Impact of AIDS, POLICY PROJECT 3 (1999),
http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SElmpact/SElmpact.Africa.PDF (describing how
HIV/AIDS hurts households economically by removing breadwinners from the
workforce and increasing medical expenditures).
35. See PETER AGGLETON ET AL., UNAIDS, HIV-RELATED STIGMA, DISCRIMINATION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMMES 4 (2005),
available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub6/c999-humrightsviol-en.pdf
("HIV-related stigma and discrimination continue to be manifest in every country and
region of the world, creating major barriers to preventing further infection, alleviating
impact and providing adequate care, support and treatment."); Heda Byron & Pros
Laput, HIV Patients in Asia Still Face Discrimination, VOANEWS (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.voanews.com/cnglish/news/asia/HIV-Patients-in-Asia-Still-Face-
)iscrimination-ll0997764.html (describing discrimination against HIV/AIDS patients
in Asia, such as ostracism by family members).
36. See Novogrodsky, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that sustained treatment improves
the quality of life for HIV-positive persons and allows them to "work, parent, and live as
full a life as possible. ); HIV/AIDS Treatment, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
IREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/treatment/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2011) ("Although there is no cure for HIV infection, there are treatment options that
can help people living with HIV experience long and productive lives."); Byron & Laput,
supra note 35 ("Breakthroughs in HIV treatment allow patients to live longer, with no
apparent symptoms."); Caitlin Hagan, CDC: HIV Testing on the Rise, CNN (Nov. 30, 2010,
12:36 I'M), http://pagingdrgupta.blogs.cnn.com/2010/11/30/hiv-testing-on-the-rise
("Early treatment of HIV, before symptoms fully develop, can eflectively prolong an
individual's life an average of 39 years.").
37. See Novogrodsky, supra note 3, at 15 ("Sustained treatment ... renders
symptoms largely invisible-an important check against some forms of abject
discrimination. . .
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who needed antiretroviral therapy were receiving it." The United
States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 ("US Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS Act") states that " [l]ack of health capacity, including
insufficient personnel and inadequate infrastructure, in sub-
Saharan Africa and other regions of the world is a critical barrier
that limits the effectiveness of efforts to combat HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria, and to achieve other global health
goals."39 The US Leadership against HIV/AIDS Act committed
more than forty-eight billion dollars over five years to the
President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief ("PEPFAR"),
"the most ambitious foreign public health program ever
launched by the United States."41
Despite the epidemic, many countries, including South
Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States deport non-
citizens with HIV/AIDS. 4' Commentators have discussed the
38. Table 4.1. Number of Adults and Children (Combined) Receiving and Needing
Antiretroviral Therapy, and Percentage Coverage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries by
Region, December 2008 to December 2009, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
http://www.who.int/hiv/data/Table4.1-2010.png (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Of the
estimated number of people needing antiretroviral therapy based on WHO 2010
guidelines, only 37% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 50% in Latin America and the Caribbean,
31% in East, South, and Southeast Asia, 19% in Europe and Central Asia, and 11% in
North Africa and the Middle East received antiretroviral therapy. Id.
39. Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-293,
§ 2, 122 Stat. 2918, 2920 (2008).
40. Senate Agrees to Triple Anti-AIDS Funding, MSNBC (July 16, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25708560/ns/politics-capitol-hill/; see David Brown,
Pact Would Give Global AIDS Fight Triple the Money, WASH. POST, (Feb. 28, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/articlc/2008/02/27/
AR2008022701409.html (describing IEPFAR as the largest foreign aid initiative aimed at
lighting a single disease in US history"); see also DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV., DFID IN 2009-10:
RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (REPORTING AND TRANSPARENcY) AcT
2006 15, 55 (2010), available at http://www.oficial-documents.gov.uk/document/
other/9780102968323/9780102968323.pdf (describing the recent contributions of the
United Kingdom's Department for International Development, including providing
anti-retroviral drugs to over 200,000 people with HIV/AIDS in twenty-two countries in
2008-09).
41. See, e.g., Tim Horn, At Least 31 Countries Deporting People Living With HIV,
AIDSMEDS (July 20, 2010), http://www.aidsmeds.com/articles/hiv-deportation
migrant_. 667_18781 .shtml; Sarah Boseley, Britain is Criticised for Deporting HIV Patients,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/01/
hiv-aids-uk-patients; South Korea to Deport HIV Positive Man, POZ (Mar. 4, 2008),
http://www.poz.com/articles/southhkorea.deport aids_ 1 14168.shtml (describing a
case in which the South Korean government ordered a man deported after he tested
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diminished access to life-sustaining treatment that results from
removal.4 2  Some international human rights courts have
considered whether there exists, or should exist, a legal
protection from removal that terminates a non-citizen's life-
sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment. 43  Several cases from the
European Court of Human Rights, and one case from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, have recognized
protections under the European Convention and the American
Declaration, respectively.44
The European Court of Human Rights is an international
judicial body established in 1959 to rule on alleged state and
individual violations of the European Convention.45 It has
jurisdiction over states that have ratified the European
Convention.46 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe elects a judge from each state from a list of candidates
provided by that state.47 The court thus has one judge for each
state that has ratified the European Convention, presently forty-
seven states.48
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, also
created in 1959, is an autonomous organ of the Organization of
American States ("OAS"), a regional organization of which the
United States is a member. 49 The Inter-American Commission on
positive for HIV); see also infra note 146 and accompanying text (stating that until a
change in the law in 2010, a non-citizen attempting to enter the United States was
inadmissible because of his HIV-positive status).
42. See Novogrodsky, supra note 3, at 14 (discussing removal of people with
HIV/AIDS as a subtopic of an emerging right to HIV/AIDS treatment in international
law); TODRYS, supra note 4, at 22 (making recommendations for protecting people with
HIV/AIDS from removal).
43. See infra Part I.C. (discussing D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 777);
Part I.E. (discussing Andrea Mortlock, Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
63/08 (2008), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/
USA12534eng.htm).
44. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the relevant provisions of those documents).
45. See The Court in Brief EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-404AAF5BC585/0/
Brochure-en-brefiEN.pdf (describing the European Court of Human Rights
generally).
46. See The ECHR in 50 Questions, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.cchr.coc.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BD-CBBB78IF42C8/
0/FAQCOOLENG_A5_0ct2010.pdf.
47. See id. (describing the election process).
48. See id.
49. See Organization ofAmerican States: Member States, INTER-AM. COMM'N ON H. RTS.,
http://www.oas.org/en/about/member-states.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2011) (listing
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Human Rights upholds human rights duties under the American
Declaration, among other documents. 50 It may only process
individual cases where a petitioner alleges that an OAS member
has violated her human rights.5 ' The United States has ratified
the Charter of the Organization of American States and
therefore the American Declaration has been considered binding
upon the United States, despite US case law to the contrary.5 2
Because the United States is a member of the OAS, Andrea
Mortlock, the applicant in the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights case discussed in Part I.E. below, was able to allege
a violation of the American Declaration.53
B. International Documents
The European Court of Human Rights has protected a non-
citizen with AIDS from removal under Article 3 of the European
Convention, while the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has protected a non-citizen with HIV under Article XXVI
member states of the Organization of American States); What is the IACHR? INTER-AM.
COMM'N ON H. R., http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2011)
(describing the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights generally).
50. See What is the IACHR?, supra note 49 (explaining that the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights applies the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man ("American Declaration") in cases brought against states not parties to
the American Convention on Human Rights); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 225, 248 (2010) ("The United States has signed the American Declaration and the
American Convention, but has not ratified the American Convention."); American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 9th Int'l Conference of
American States, art. 23, O.A.S. Offlicial Record, OEA/Ser.l./V/l1.23 (May 12, 1948)
[hereinafter American Declaration].
51. See What is the IACHR?, supra note 49 ("The Commission may only process
individual cases where it is alleged that one of the member [s]tates of the OAS is
responsible for the human rights violation at issue.").
52. See What is the IACHR?, supra note 49; Lise Johnson, "You Can Violate the Rights
of Undocumented Persons with Impunity": The Shocking Message Arizona's
Constitution Sends and its Inconsistency with International Law, 13J. GENDER RACE&
JUST. 491, n. 97 (2010). But see jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 647, 767 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (stating that the United States is not a signatory to the American Convention and
holding that the American Declaration is not a treaty and thus cannot legally bind US
federal courts); State v. Phillips, 656 N.E.2d 643, 671 (Ohio 1995) (indicating that the
US senate approved the Charter of the Organization of American States with the
reservation that none of its provisions would be construed to limit any of the powers that
are reserved to the states by the US Constitution).
53. See infra Part I.E. (discussing the Andrea Mortlock case, in which the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights ruled that the United States had violated the
American Declaration).
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of the American Declaration.54 Article 3 of the European
Convention states that " [n] o one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."55 In the
case of deportation, the deporting state is responsible for even
those acts of torture, ill-treatment or punishment of the receiving
state. 56 The European Court of Human Rights has held that it
would not consider conflicting interests of the deporting state
when considering whether a violation of Article 3 has occurred;
the prohibition in that article is absolute.57 Article XXVI of the
American Declaration, titled "Right to due process of law,"
provides that "[e]very person accused of an offense has the right
to be given an impartial and public hearing, and to be tried by
courts previously established in accordance with pre-existing laws,
and not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment."5 8
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has generally
recognized violations of Article XXVI in cases involving torture,
disappearances, and exile.59
The European Convention does not bind US federal courts,
and whether the American Declaration binds US federal courts is
54. See infra Part I.C. (discussing the case of D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 777 (1997), before the European Court of Human Rights); Part I.E. (discussing the
case of Andrea Mortlock before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
55. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
56. See generally Socring v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)
(protecting from extradition a US citizen charged with murder who would likely receive
the death penalty if returned to the United States); see also Gianluca Gentili, European
Court of Human Rights: An Absolute Ban on Deportation of Foreign Citizens to Countries Where
Torture or Ill-Treatment is a Genuine Risk, 8 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 311, 314 (2010) ("Under
Article 3, even those acts of torture or ill-treatment carried out by the receiving state
remain the responsibility of the deporting state.").
57. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1855 (holding that
the activities of the person who would be expelled, "however undesirable or dangerous,
cannot be a material consideration" in determining whether the state has violated
Article 3); see also Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 248, 289
(1991) (characterizing Article 3 as absolute).
58. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 50, art.
xxvi.
59. See, e.g., Gobardhan, Case 9265, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 1/85,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (holding that the Government of Suriname
violated Articles I, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the American Declaration by arresting,
torturing, and sentencing eleven individuals without due process); Bastos, Case 8027,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Report No. 5/84, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.63, doc. 10 (1984) (holding that
the Paraguayan government had violated Article XXVI of the American Declaration,
inter alia, by arresting, arbitrarily detaining, and exiling a well-known writer).
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unclear.60 International case law under these documents,
however, is relevant to removal of non-citizens from the United
States to the limited extent that customary international law has
force in US federal courts.61 Customary international law refers to
the "soft, indeterminate" body of law which general customs and
practices of nations, international conventions, and the teachings
of legal scholars have created.62 A US court shall resort to
customary international law only where there is no controlling
executive or legislative act, judicial decision, or treaty. 63 For
example, in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, the District Court of Kansas
prohibited the indeterminate detention of an excludable alien
under customary international law, although US statutory and
constitutional law did not prohibit his detention.64 Scholars,
however, debate the extent to which US federal courts may apply
customary international law.6 5 The status of the European
60. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 55 (stating that the
governments signatory to the European Convention arc members of the Council of
Europe); see also supra note 52 (discussing whether the American Declaration binds US
federal courts).
61. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing the role of customary
international law in US domestic jurisprudence).
62. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003)
("[C] ustomary international law-as the term itself implies-is created by the general
customs and practices of nations and therefore does not stem from any single, definitive,
readily-identifiable source."); see also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D.
Kan. 1980), affd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Principles of
customary international law may be discerned from an overview of express international
conventions, the teachings of legal scholars, the general custom and practice of nations
and relevant judicial decisions.").
63. See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)) ("Customary
international law comes into play only 'where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision."'); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56,
92 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700) ("It has long been
established that customary international law is part of the law of the United States to the
limited extent that 'where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must he had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.'").
64. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 798 (recognizing a remedy under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights because,
although the United States has not expressly consented to be bound by those
documents, widespread prohibition of arbitrary detention among other nations created
binding customary international law).
65. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS lAW § I reporters'
note 3 (1987) (stating that "the modern view is that customary international law in the
United States is federal law") with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
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Convention as a source of customary international law is also
unclear.66 The Sections that follow discuss three cases from which
may be emerging customary international law prohibiting
removal that terminates HIV/AIDS treatment. Specifically, the
discussion includes two European Court of Human Rights cases,
followed by one Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
case.
C. D. v. United Kingdom
In D. v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights considered the removal of a non-citizen with AIDS who
would lose access to medical treatment in the receiving country.67
The St. Kitts native, known as "D.," sought temporary entry to the
United Kingdom.68 Immigration authorities, however, found him
in possession of cocaine at Gatwick Airport in London.69 He was
arrested and charged with a drug offense. While serving his
prison sentence, he suffered an attack of pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia, and was subsequently diagnosed with HIV and as
suffering from AIDS. 70
Based upon the advanced stage of his illness and the lack of
medical treatment available in his native country, D. sought relief
from removal from the Secretary of State and the Court of
Appeal underthe asylum law of the United Kingdom and Article
3 of the European Convention. These attempts were
unsuccessful.71 The Secretary of State pointed out the unfairness
of allowing an AIDS sufferer to remain in the country unlawfully
Riv. 815, 817 (1997) ("[Customary international law] should not have the status of
federal common law.").
66. Compare Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 797 ("Two other principle sources of
fundamental human rights are the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights"), and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing
American Convention and European Convention as sources of customary international
law), with Chen v. Ashcroft, 85 F. App'x 700, 705 (10th Cir. 2004) ("As to the European
Convention on Human Rights, it is an instrument applicable only to its regional state
parties and not intended to create new rules of customary international law.").
67. D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 777, 782-83.
68. Id. at 782 (stating that he sought leave to remain in the United Kingdom for
two weeks as a visitor).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 782-83.
71. Id. at 783-84.
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so that he could receive treatment at public expense.72 The Court
of Appeal deferred to the judgment of the chief immigration
officer in the lower court, holding that although his life
expectancy may well be shorter if he were removed than if he
received care in the United Kingdom, he would not have been
imprisoned and diagnosed in the United Kingdom if he had not
smuggled drugs into the country.73 A professor of immunology
subsequently reported that D.'s prognosis was limited to eight to
twelve months on his current regimen, and withdrawal of his
current treatment regimen would reduce his life expectancy by
more than half.74
D. contested his removal before the European Court of
Human Rights under Article 3 of the European Convention,
which declares that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."75 He argued
that his removal would violate Article 3 because of the advanced
stage of his AIDS, the lack of available treatment in St. Kitts, and
the lack of family to care for him there.76 The government of the
United Kingdom argued that if D. were removed, his hardship
and reduced life expectancy would stem from his illness
combined with a deficient health and welfare system, which does
not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article
3.77 The government also disputed D.'s claim that he would lose
access to AIDS treatment and that no family would care for him
in St. Kitts.78
72. Id. at 783 ("[W]e do not accept ... that it is right generally or in the individual
circumstances of this case, to allow an AIDS sufferer to remain here exceptionally when,
as here, treatment in this country is carried out at public expense, under the National
Health Service.").
73. Id. at 78-84 ("[H]e would not be here if he had not come on a cocaine
smuggling expedition in 1993; and if he had not been imprisoned he would have gone
back to St Kitts, if he had ever come here at all, long before his AIDS was diagnosed.").
74. Id. at 784-85.
75. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 55, art. 3; see D. v. United
Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. at 790.
76. D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 785.
77. Id. at 790-91 (noting that the applicant would "find himself in the same
situation as other AIDS victims in St. Kitts" if removed, and arguing that " [i]n fact he
would have been returned in January 1993 to St. Kitts, where he had spent most of his
life, had it not been for his prosecution and conviction").
78. Id. at 791 (stating that the applicant had at least one cousin in St. Kitts and that
hospitals in St. Kitts treated AIDS patients).
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The European Court of Human Rights ultimately prohibited
his removal under Article 3 of the European Convention.79 The
court stressed that Article 3 prohibits "torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment" in deportation cases in absolute terms,
regardless of the conduct of the individual in question.s0 The
Court considered the applicant's grave prognosis, his lack of
family members in St. Kitts who could care for him, and the
overall lack of social and emotional support in his native
country.8 ' The court held that it must scrutinize a claim under
Article 3 even where, as here, the treatment in question in the
receiving country does not itself violate Article 3, nor is the
treatment the direct or indirect responsibility of public
authorities in that country.82 The court concluded that, in light
of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the critical stage
of the applicant's AIDS, D.'s removal to St. Kitts would amount to
inhuman treatment by the state in violation of Article 3.83
D. v. United Kingdom was a "landmark" case that at least one
scholar has called extreme and exceptional.84 Commentators
have remarked that the case revealed that Article 3 essentially
79. Id. at 799. The European Court of' Human Rights also considered, and
ultimately declined to recognize, the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 13 of the
European Convention. See id.
80. Id. at 792 (referencing Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831,
and noting "the Court has repeatedly stressed in its line of authorities involving
extradition, expulsion or deportation of individuals to third countries that Article 3 (art.
3) prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment and that its guarantees apply irrespective of the reprehensible nature of the
conduct of the person in question").
81. Id. at 795 ("Any medical treatment which he might hope to receive there could
not contend with the infections which he may possibly contract on account of his lack of
shelter and of a proper diet as well as exposure to the health and sanitation problems
which bcset the population of St. Kitts."). The court stated that while the petitioner had
a cousin in St. Kitts, there was no evidence that the cousin could attend to a terminally ill
man. Id.
82. Id. at 792 ("[T]he source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving
country stems from factors which cannot engage either directly or indirectly the
responsibility of the public authorities of that country, or which, taken alone, do not in
themselves infringe the standards of [Article 3].").
83. Id. at 793 ("In view of these exceptional circumstances and bearing in mind the
critical stage now reached in the applicant's fatal illness, the implementation of the
decision to remove him to St Kitts would amount to inhuman treatment by the
respondent State in violation of Article 3.").
84. See, e.g., TolRYS, supra note 4, at 7 (calling the case "landmark"); Paul
Schoukens, The Right to Access Health Care: Health Care According to European Social Security
Law Instruments, 27 MilD. & L. 501, 530 (2008) ("[D. v. United Kingdom] dealt with a
rather exceptional and extreme situation.").
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prohibits interference with human dignity, or the right to die
with dignity.85 Regardless of the case's exceptional nature, D. v.
United Kingdom stands for the proposition that removal of a non-
citizen to a country where she would lose access to life-sustaining
AIDS treatment may constitute a violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention.86
D. N. v. United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights also considered the
issue in the case of N. v. United Kingdom, in which a citizen and
national of Uganda with HIV, known as "N.," made an analogous
argument against her removal under Article 3 of the European
Convention.87 A physician prepared an expert report stating that
the medications N. needed were available in Uganda, but were
quite costly and in limited supply in her home town. 8 The
physician further reported that "there was no provision for
publicly funded blood monitoring, basic nursing care, social
security, food, or housing" in Uganda.89 Prior to applying to the
European Court of Human Rights, N. appeared in United
Kingdom domestic courts claiming protection from removal both
under asylum law and under Article 3 of the European
Convention.90 The adjudicator in one such court allowed the
appeal on Article 3 grounds by reference to D. v. United Kingdom
and because, according to Asylum Directorate Instructions, leave
to remain was mandated "[w]here there is credible medical
evidence that return, due to the medical facilities in the country
concerned, would reduce the applicant's life expectancy and
subject him to acute physical and mental suffering, in
circumstances where the UK can be regarded as having assumed
85. See John Coggon, Could the Right to Die with Dignity Represent a New Right to Die in
English Law? 14 MED. L. REV. 219, 230 (2006) ("The right to die with dignity derives
from D v. UK'); see also Inna Nazarova, Comment, Alienating "Human"from "Right". U.S.
and UK Non-Compliance with Asylum Obligations Under International Human Rights Law, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1335, 1353 (2002) ("The decision in D. v. UK showed that the
touchstone of the conduct prohibited by Article 3 is interference with human dignity.").
86. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text (discussing the claim and holding
in D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997)).
87. See Case of N. v. United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008).
88. Id. at 1 12.
89. Id. at 1 12.
90. Id. at 1l 13, 17.
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responsibility for his care.""' The Secretary of State appealed to
the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, which reversed upon a finding
that medical treatment for HIV/AIDS is available in Uganda.92 N.
appealed to two higher courts without success.93
The European Court of Human Rights held that Article 3
only applies in an exceptional case, where the applicant's illness
had reached a very advanced or terminal stage, and the receiving
state's probable lack of medical care and social support,
including support from family members, would deprive the
applicant of "the most basic human dignity as his illness runs its
inevitably painful and fatal course." 94 The Court discussed several
other cases that had considered similar Article 3 violations.95
These included D. v. United Kingdom and B.B. v. France, in which
the European Commission of Human Rights concluded that
B.B.'s deportation would violate Article 3 of the European
Convention because he would lack access to HIV/AIDS
treatment and family support, compromising his human dignity
as the illness ran its course.96 The court distinguished the present
91. Id. at 13 (citing D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997)).
92. See id. at 14 (stating that although medical provision in the United Kingdom
exceeds that in Uganda, Uganda has made great progress in that area and the
applicant's return there would not, therefore, lead to a "complete absence of medical
treatment" as the Asylum Directorate Instructions prohibit).
93. See id. at 11 15, 17. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal on grounds that
treatment in Uganda would not be altogether absent, and, therefore, this is not such an
exceptional case that it should fall under Article 3 of the Convention. Id. at 1 17. "[Any
extension of the D. principles] would risk drawing into the United Kingdom large
numbers of people already suffering from HIV in the hope that they too could remain
here indefinitely so that they could take the benclit of the medical resources that are
available in this country. This would result in a very great and no doubt unquantifiable
commitment of resources ... ." Id.
94. See id. at 1 22 (citing D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997))
(noting that in previous cases, the European Court of Human Rights had focused more
on the applicant's present condition and prognosis than on the availability of treatment
in the receiving country).
95. See infra note 96 (discussing cases that the European Court of Human Rights
considered in N. v. United Kingdom, [CC], App. No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008)).
96. See B.B. v. France, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2596. In B.B. v. France, the applicant
submitted physicians' reports stating that he was suffering from AIDS and that treatment
was unavailable in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Id. at 2603. The European
Commission of Human Rights referred the case to the European Court of Human
Rights upon a finding that the applicant's removal would violate Article 3 of the
European Convention. Id. at 2605. Before the European Court of Human Rights could
rule, France responded by quashing the removal order. Id. See also Arcila v. Netherlands,
App. No. 13669/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), 7-8 (distinguishing the case of an HIV-positive
Colombian national from D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997), and
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case from D. v. United Kingdom and B.B. v. France because the
applicant's illness was currently stable, she had family members
in Uganda, and the treatment she required was available in
Uganda, although costly. 7 The court additionally distinguished
the present case from D. v. United Kingdom because the latter case
focused on "ensuring a dignified death rather than prolonging
life."98 The court ultimately denied N. relief from removal under
Article 3 because her case did not meet the "high threshold" that
D. v. United Kingdom had established.99 The court held that the
threshold in cases involving lost access to HIV/AIDS medications
should remain high because the treatment in question involved a
naturally occurring illness combined with lack of resources in the
receiving country, rather than from "intentional acts or
omissions."o0 1 Together D. v. United Kingdom and N. v. United
Kingdom demonstrate that while removal terminating life-
sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment may violate Article 3 of the
European Convention, protection is limited and reserved for
exceptional cases.101
E. Andrea Mortlock
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also
considered the issue in Andrea Mortlock, a case that involved a
national and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States as
a lawful permanent resident with her family in 1979, when she
B.B. v. France , 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2596, because the applicant's illness had not
reached an advanced or terminal stage and he had a prospect of medical care and family
support in his country of origin); Ndangoya v. Sweden, App. No. 17868/03, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2004) 13 (declaring petitioner's application inadmissible on the grounds that the
applicant's illness had not reached an "advanced or terminal stage;" adequate albeit
expensive treatment was available in Tanzania, and that he maintained some links with
relatives who might be able to help him).
97. See Case of N. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26565/05, Eur. CL. H.R. (2008),
11 22-24 ("The case-law further demonstrated that 'exceptional circumstances' would
be found only where the applicant's illness had reached a very advanced or terminal
stage and where the probable lack of medical care and support, including support from
family members, in the receiving State would be such as to deprive him or her of 'the
most basic human dignity as his illness runs its inevitably painful and fatal course."').
98. Id. at 11 23-24.
99. Id. at 143.
100. Id.
101. See supra Part L.C-D. (discussing D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R.
777 (1997), and N. v. United Kingdom, [GC], App. No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008)).
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was fifteen years old. 02 Mortlock was later convicted of drug
offenses'03 and arrested for criminal possession of stolen property
in the third degree, an offense to which she pled guilty.104 In
1998, Mortlock tested positive for HIV and was diagnosed with
AIDS. 05
On the basis of Mortlock's criminal convictions, US
immigration authorities pursued a deportation order against her
in 2006.106 In 2008, in an effort to prevent her removal, she
appealed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
alleging that her removal to Jamaica, where she would lose access
to life-sustaining HIV medication, would violate Article XXVI of
the American Declaration, which prohibited "cruel, infamous or
unusual punishment." 0 7 She argued that her removal would
effectively result in her "protracted suffering and an
unnecessarily premature death." 08
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
generally agrees to decide on a matter's admissibility only upon
determination that the applicant has exhausted domestic
remedies in accordance with general principles of international
law. 09 In Andrea Mortlock, however, the Commission stated that a
petitioner need not exhaust domestic remedies if such
proceedings would "be obviously futile or have no reasonable
prospect of success.""10 Mortlock's complaint was essentially that
her removal constituted cruel and unusual punishment, which
102. Andrea Mortlock, Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/08,
14, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/USAI 2534eng.htm.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. at 16.
106. Id. at 20.
107. American Declaration, supra note 50, at art. XXVI; see also Andrea Mortlock, at
i 21, 24 (presenting the petitioners' allegations that a number of medications
Mortlock required would not be available in Jamaica, nor did she have doctors, family,
friends, or acquaintances there).
108. See Andrea Mortlock, at 1 21.
109. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OAS, art. 31 (Oct. 28-Nov. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/lasicl8.RulesOflrocedurcIACHR.htm ("In
order to decide on the admissibility of a matter, the Commission shall verify whether the
remedies of the domestic legal system have been pursued and exhausted in accordance
with the generally recognized principles of international law."); see also Andrea Mortlock,
at 1 53 (discussing Article 31 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure as a requirement
for the Commission to consider a matter's admissibility).
110. See Andrea Mortlock, at 166.
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coincides with the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution."'
The Commission noted that numerous US courts have held that
the Eighth Amendment does not protect non-US citizens from
removal from the United States." 2 The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights accordingly concluded that
presenting Mortlock's case before the US Court of Appeals would
be futile, and she could therefore present her case before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights." 3
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
acknowledged "that Member States have the right, as [a] matter
of well-established international law, to control the entry,
residence, and expulsion of aliens," but that "in exercising this
right to expel such aliens, the Member States must have regard to
certain protections which enshrine fundamental values of
democratic societies."" 4 The Commission stated that it would
consider customary international law, and D. v. United Kingdom in
particular, as a basis for deciding the case." 5
The United States asserted that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause in the American Declaration does not protect
Mortlock because removal does not amount to punishment for a
crime." 6 This is consistent with US Supreme and Circuit Court
111. Id. at 1 64 ("[TIhe Commission observes that the essence of the complaint is
that Ms. Mortlock's removal to Jamaica would amount to cruel, inhumane punishment
in violation of Article XXVI of the American Declaration, which conveniently coincides
with the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.").
112. Id. at 64 & n. 43 (citing Elia v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 667, 675 (6th Cir. 2005)).
113. Id. at 65 ("Therefore, it is possible to conclude that issues similar to those
brought before the Commission in Ms. Mortlock's petition, have been the subject of
unsuccessful litigation in domestic courts and that in the present case pursuing a
remedy before a Court of Appeals would be Futile and with no reasonable prospect of
success."); id. at 11 67-71 (noting that the Commission also considered that the claim
was timely, colorable, and lacked duplication in concluding that the matter was
admissible before the Commission).
114. Id. at 78.
115. Id. at 80 ("[1]n determining the present case, the Commission will, to the
extent appropriate, interpret and apply the pertinent provisions of the American
Declaration in light of current developments in the field of international human rights
law, as evidenced by treaties, custom and other relevant sources of international law.").
116. Id. at 1 44 ("The State maintains that Article XXVI of the Declaration is a
provision relating specifically to criminal prosecution, conviction and sentencing.
Therefore, the Petitioners' invocation of this article in the immigration context is
improper since immigration removal of Ms. Mortlock can in no way be characterized as
'punishment' tinder Article XXVI of the Declaration.").
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rulings." 7 The United States further asserted that D. v. United
Kingdom was distinguishable as an exceptional case concerning
death with dignity."
The Commission countered that deportation could be
"tantamount to a form of punishment."" 9 Punishment, the
Commission reasoned, "is the infliction of some kind of pain or
loss upon a person in response to wrongdoing."12 0 Therefore, any
detrimental change in the status quo of an alien facing
deportation could be equivalent to punishment. 2' The
Commission stated that this punishment is particularly severe
where, as here, the alien has lived in a country for thirty years
and deportation would force her to leave her family and battle a
potentially fatal disease without their support.'22 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights held that, although
Mortlock's death was not imminent, and therefore, did not
concern "the dignity of death, it would be illogical to confine the
scope of relief to such cases."' 23 In the instant case, the
Commission emphasized, Mortlock's removal and resulting loss
of treatment could be fatal.'24
The Commission then defined the standard in the case as
"whether, on humanitarian grounds, a person's medical
condition, [sic] is such that he or she should not be expelled
unless it can be shown that the medical and social facilities that
117. See Elia, 431 F.3d at 276 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039
(1984)) (holding that the cruel and unusual punishment clause tinder the Eighth
Amendment is "inapplicable to deportation proceedings because, as the US Supreme
Court has held, deportation does not constitute punishment"); LeTourneur v. INS, 538
F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that deportation is not a "punishment tinder
the Eighth Amendment even though the penalty may be severe."); see also supra note 27
(discussing deportation as punishment and surrounding debate).
118. See Andrea Mortiock, at 1 45 (stating that, in D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur.
Ct. H.R. 777 (1997), the applicant's final days upon removal would be extremely
distressing, thus constituting inhuman treatment).
119. Id. at1 85.
120. Id.
121. Id. ("[T]he Commission considers that a change in status quo to the detriment
of an alien subject to a deportation procedure could be tantamount to a form of
punishment.").
122. Id. (explaining that deportation must be examined on subjective terms,
whereby a case such as this is not comparable to a case where someone is deported after
three weeks, and noting the Commission's position that "in the ancient legal traditions,
banishment was considered the ultimate punishment.").
123. Id. at190.
124. Id.
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he or she undeniably requires are actually available in the
receiving state."125 The Commission articulated that the case
turned on "whether deportation will create extraordinary
hardship to the deportee and her family and may well amount to
a death sentence given . . . (1) the availability of medical care in
the receiving country and (2) the availability of social services
and support, in particular the presence of close relatives." 26 The
Commission then considered the advanced stages of Mortlock's
illness, her lack of family or acquaintances in Jamaica, and her
nearly thirty-year presence in the United States,127 concluding
that HIV/AIDS treatment in Jamaica, although improved in
recent years, was insufficient to meet Mortlock's needs.'28 The
stigma and discrimination that people with HIV/AIDS
experience in Jamaica also troubled the Commission.129 Thus,
the Commission held that her removal would violate the cruel,
infamous, and unusual punishment clause in Article XXVI of the
American Declaration. 30
From the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights discussed
above have emerged a protection from removal that defies easy
definition. The crux of the protection is recognition that removal
that terminates life-sustaining medical treatment, sometimes
coupled with social factors, constitutes a violation of rights.
European Court of Human Rights case law suggests that this is
the right to die with dignity, when a person's removal will
exacerbate her already serious terminal illness in its advanced
stages. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights'
decision in Andrea Mortlock defined the right as a right to be free
from removal that would terminate life-sustaining medical
treatment, combined with social factors, that effectively amounts
125. Id. at 191.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1 92. ("The current quality of life she now enjoys results from the
availability of treatment and medication in the United States and the care received from
her family and support system.").
128. Id. at 1 93 ("[Tlhc country's health care system is still insuficient to meet Ms.
Mortlock's medical needs.").
129. Id. ("Moreover of greater concerning, are the reports that people with
HIV/AIDS in Jamaica suffer from stigma and discrimination.")
130. Id. at 1 102 ("The Commission hereby concludes that ... the issuance of a
deportation order against Ms. Andrea Mortlock violates the protection of Article XXVI
of the American Declaration not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment.").
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to a death sentence. This Note now turns to US domestic legal
protections from removal, and their consequences to non-US
citizens with HIV/AIDS who face the loss of access to treatment
upon removal.'3'
II. PROTECTIONS FROM REMOVAL OF NON-US CITIZENS
WITH HIV/AIDS
The provisions that international bodies have invoked in
protecting non-citizens from removal that would terminate
HIV/AIDS treatment are reminiscent of the Eighth Amendment
to the US Constitution, which prohibits "cruel and unusual
punishments."13 2 All US Courts of Appeals have held that a non-
US citizen may not invoke the Eighth Amendment to contest
deportation proceedings because, as the US Supreme Court
held, deportation does not constitute punishment for a crime. 33
Non-US citizens contesting their removal on the basis of
termination of life-sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment, therefore,
must contest their removal under one of three US domestic laws,
namely, asylum, withholding of removal, and the law enacting
CAT. 34 Section A introduces the legal obstacles that non-US
citizens must overcome to obtain legal status in the United States,
namely inadmissibility grounds and statutory categories into
which one must fit to become a US citizen. Section B discusses
asylum law and its application to cases involving removal that
terminates HIV/AIDS treatment. Section C explains protection
from removal under the law of withholding of removal, and how
withholding might be applied to cases involving removal that
eliminates HIV/AIDS treatment. Lastly, Section D examines US
domestic law that enacts CAT, and its application to removal that
terminates HIV/AIDS treatment.
131. See infra Parts II-III. (describing domestic protections from removal and their
degrees of success and arguing that the United States should recognize a protection
under customary international law against removal in this context).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see supra Part LB. (discussing the relevant provisions
of the European Convention and the American Declaration).
133. See supra note 10 (discussing consideration of Eighth Amendment protections
in the context of deportation proceedings).
134. See infra Part II.B-D. (discussing asylum, withholding, and the law enacting
CAT).
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A. Obstacles to US Citizenship
According to its longstanding jurisprudence, the United
States excludes non-citizens in the name of national sovereignty
and in the interest of national security.'35 The Department of
Homeland Security, via Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE"), enforces immigration laws in order to prevent terrorism
and protect borders against illicit trade, travel, and finance.136
ICE's objectives include, as stated by the Counterterrorism and
Criminal Exploitation Unit, preventing "terrorists and other
criminals from exploiting the nation's immigration system." 37
Legal protection from removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment
could have the unintended consequence of encouraging illegal
immigration of non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS who hope to
secure treatment in the United States.'38 This would arguably be
an exploitation of US immigration law, and would also increase
commitment of US resources to HIV/AIDS treatment.'3" Non-US
citizens compete with these interests and concerns when they
attempt to gain US citizenship or contest removal, particularly
where they require HIV/AIDS treatment.140
A non-US citizen living in the United States must overcome
two obstacles in order to gain legal status in the United States.141
135. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ("The power of Congress
over the admission of aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touching
as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations
and the national security."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952)
(holding that expulsion of aliens is a weapon of defense inherent in every sovereign
state).
136. ICE OVERVIEW, US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/about/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
137. See COUNTERTERRORISM AND CRIMINAL EXPiO[TATION UNIT, US IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/counterterrorism-criminal-
exploitation/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
138. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing this argument as made
by the House of Lords in an appeal preceding N. v. United Kingdom, [CC], App. No.
26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008)).
139. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (arguing that protecting people with
HIV/AIDS from removal terminating treatment "would result in a very great and no
doubt unquantifiable commitment of resources").
140. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing criminal grounds of
inadmissibility in the United States); cf supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the right of the United States to exclude non-citizens and the rationale for
doing so).
141. See LLGOMSKY & RODGRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 7; THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 122 (3d ed. 1995).
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First, she must not fall within any of the inadmissibility grounds
provided in section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.142 Second, she must fit within one of the qualifying statutory
categories.14 3
Inadmissibility grounds may be criminally related or health-
related.144 The health-related grounds provide that a non-US
citizen is inadmissible if she is determined, in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to have a "communicable disease of public health
significance."' 45 The Department of Health and Human Services
has provided a list of such illnesses that make a non-US citizen
inadmissible, and HIV was on that list until November 2, 2009,
when it was removed to reduce stigma associated with the disease
and to encourage HIV testing. 146 The removal of HIV from the
list of communicable diseases took effect on January 4, 2010, and
consequently non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS are no longer
inadmissible because they have HIV/AIDS.147
142. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 7 (stating that inadmissibility
grounds include, for example, grounds relating to crime, national security, health, and
public assistance, but explaining that these grounds may be overcome via statutory
waivers to inadmissibility grounds). See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006) for a complete list of grounds of inadmissibility.
143. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 7 ("To qualify for
admission . . . [he] or she must lit within one of the statutory pigeonholes.").
144. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006)
(providing the health-related circumstances and criminal convictions that make a non-
US citizen inadmissible).
145. See id.
146. See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at
Signing of the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009 (Oct. 30, 2009),
in 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00864 ("Now, we talk about reducing the stigma of this
disease, yet we've treated a visitor living with it as a threat .. . [eliminating the HIV travel
ban is] a step that will encourage people to get tested and get treatment, it's a step that
will keep families together, and it's a step that will save lives."); Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) Infection Removed from CDC List of Communicable Diseases of Public Health
Significance, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERv., http://www.uscis.gov/uscis-ext-
templating/uscis/ (search "HIV;" then follow "Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Infection Removed from CDC List of Communicable Diseases and Public Health
Significance") (last updated May 18, 2010) (describing the change in law and discussing
the consequences of this change for non-citizens).
147. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.2 (2010) (showing HIV is no longer listed as an illness the
diagnosis of which bars admission to the United States); Medical Examination of Aliens-
Removal of Human Immunodeliciency Virus (HIV) Infection From Definition of
Communicable Disease of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg. 56, 547 (Nov. 2,
2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 34) ("Through this final rule, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), within the U.S. Department of Health and
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A non-US citizen with HIV/AIDS who is admissible must still
overcome a second legal obstacle in order to gain legal status and
remain in the United States: she must fit within one of the
qualifying statutory categories.'"4 These categories include
employment, family reunification, and asylum.149 Non-US citizens
living in the United States with HIV/AIDS who face removal have
several potential legal protections based on their HIV/AIDS
status. 50 These legal protections include asylum, withholding of
removal, and 8 C.F.R. sections 208.16-208.18, which enacted
CAT.'5 '
B. Asylum
The law of asylum in the United States derives from two
international law documents, the Refugee Convention and the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
("Refugee Protocol").' 5 2 These two documents advance the
principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of
refugees to countries where they face persecution based on their
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.' 5 The United States incorporated
provisions of the Refugee Protocol under the Refugee Act of
Human Services (-IHS), is amending its regulations to remove 'Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection' from the definition of communicable disease
of public health significance and remove references to 'HIV' from the scope of
examinations for aliens.").
148. See AiEINIKOFF ET AI.., supra note 141, at 122 ("An alien ... must show initially
that he or she qualifies for admission by meeting certain categorical qualifying
requirements. . . ."); LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 7-8 (describing the
three main programs of statutory pigeonholes as family reunification, employment, and
diversity).
149. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 7-9 (outlining the programs
under which a non-citizen may obtain legal immigration status in the United States).
150. See infra Part II.I--D. (discussing the applications of asylum law, withholding,
and the law enacting CAT to cases in which a non-citizen would lose access to needed
HIV/AIDS treatment if removed).
151. See infra Part II.B-D. (discussing asylum, withholding, and CAT and their
application to removal, which would terminate HIV/AIDS treatment).
152. Convention Relating to the Status of Refigees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267; see also Hughes, supra note 14, at 229 (noting that the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees are the
sources of US asylum law).
153. See Hughes, supra note 14, at 229 (discussing the sources of US asylum law and
defining non-refoulement).
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1980 ("Refugee Act").' 54 Under the Refugee Act, the US
Attorney General may grant asylum to a claimant determined to
be a "refugee."' 55 The Refugee Act defines "refugee" as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.'56
In at least some circumstances, US courts have accepted
HIV-positive status as a basis for "membership in a particular
social group" for purposes of asylum law.'57 Oftentimes an asylum
applicant with HIV/AIDS claims status as an HIV-positive
homosexual,'5 8 and homosexuality may be the basis of an asylum
claim based on membership in a particular social group.'59
154. See id.
155. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (2006).
157. See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he INS
recognized that 'in certain circumstances .. . persons with HIV or AIDS may constitute a
particular social group under refugee law."); Ostracism, Lack of Medical Care Support HIV
Positive Alien's Asylum Quest, IF Rules, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 229, 233-35 (2001)
[hereinafter Ostracism] (reporting that an immigration judge granted asylum based on a
non-citizen's HIV-positive status); IJ Grants Asylum to HIV Positive Man, General Counsel
Issues HIV Instructions, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 889, 901-02 (1996) [hereinafter IF
Grants Asylum] (reporting that an immigration judge granted asylum on the basis of
membership in a particular social group-people infected with HIV).
158. See, e.g., Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 655-56 (8th Cir. 2007)
(denying the asylum claim of a non-US citizen who alleged that he feared persecution
based on his homosexuality and HIV-positive status); Paredes v. Att'y Gen., 219 F. App'x
879, 888 (11 th Cir. 2007) (holding that substantial evidence supported the immigration
judge's determination that the non-citizen would not be persecuted based on his
homosexuality and HIV-positive status); Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1090-
91 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting asylum based on the non-citizen's homosexuality and HIV-
positive status).
159. See Maldonado v. Att'y Gen., 188 F. App'x 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Maldonado's homosexuality can
be the basis for an asylum claim based on membership in a 'particular social group.');
Uribe v. Ashcroft, 105 F. App'x 941, 942 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[S]exual assault and beatings
on account of homosexuality can qualify as persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group." (citing Hernandcz-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093-94 (9th
Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
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Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler and Paredes v. Attorney General, discussed
below, exemplify this overlap.160
After demonstrating membership in a particular social
group, asylum applicants must also show persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution based on that membership in a
particular social group.16' US federal courts have defined
persecution as "infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to
one's person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated
grounds in the refugee definition."' 6 2 US federal courts have
held that low-level intimidation and harassment alone do not
comprise the persecution required under US asylum law.'63 Well-
founded fear of persecution has an objective and subjective
component; the applicant must demonstrate both actual fear and
objective facts supporting that fear.164
Asylum applicants with HIV/AIDS often attempt to
demonstrate persecution by showing multiple factors, including
inadequate medical care, employment and medical care
discrimination, or physical harm or detention based on their
HIV/AIDS status.'65 Asylum applicants with HIV/AIDS claiming
160. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
161. Cf Ixtlilco-Morales, 507 F.3d at 655-56 (denying the petition of an HIV-positive
citizen of Mexico because the record supported the Board of' Immigration Appeals'
conclusion "that Morales failed to establish that inadequacies in health care for HIV-
positive individuals in Mexico was an attempt to persecute those with HIV"); Paredes, 219
F. App'x at 888 (denying the petition of an HIV-positive homosexual citizen of
Venezuela because he "failed to establish past persecution in Venezuela, or a well-
founded fear of future persecution if he returned to Venezuela, on account of his
membership in a particular social group, namely, HIV-infected homosexual men").
162. Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005); see Regalado-Garcia v. INS,
305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Persecution is the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one's person or freedom, on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
163. See, e.g., Makatengkeng v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Low-
level intimidation and harassment alone do not rise to the level of persecution.");
Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000) ("To qualify as persecution, a person's
experience must rise above unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering.").
164. See, e.g., Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring an
applicant to show both a subjective fear of persecution and objective facts supporting
that fear); Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) ("An alien
possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in her circumstances
would fear persecution if she were to be returned to her native country.").
165. See Tafzil, supra note 4, at 519 (providing a table of the number of asylum
cases based on HIV-positive status and the makeup of bases for claims). Eighty-five
percent of cases uncovered were claims of inadequate medical care, and this includes
cases involving additional claims. Id.; see also Bocr-Scdano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082,
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that their removal from the United States would result in loss of
life-sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment have had mixed results.166 At
least two of these claims have succeeded when combined with
ostracism based on HIV/AIDS status. 67
US federal courts have denied asylum claims that have relied
on inadequate medical care in the home country because
inadequate medical care does not amount to persecution under
US asylum law. 168 In Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, the Eighth Circuit
upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that
"to the extent that Morales's claim was based on a lack of medical
care for HIV-positive persons in Mexico, . . . Morales did not
establish that the lack of care was an attempt to persecute
homosexuals or those with HIV."1 69 In Paredes v. Attorney General,
an HIV-positive homosexual of Venezuelan citizenship applied
for asylum, arguing that the Venezuelan government prioritized
HIV medication distribution such that women and children were
served first and, therefore, HIV-positive homosexual men were
often left untreated.170 The Eleventh Circuit denied asylum
because at least one organization provided HIV medications and
thus "it is at least possible for HIV-infected homosexual men to
obtain medications through means other than the Venezuelan
government."' 7 ' In Hernaez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit denied
asylum to an HIV-positive homosexual man who claimed that
medical treatment for HIV is not available in his home country of
1091 (9th Cir. 2005); infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text (discussing Boer-Sedano,
418 F.3d 1082).
166. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text (discussing cases based on loss
of HIV/AIDS treatment).
167. See Ostracism, supra note 157, at 233 (reporting that an immigration judge
ruled "that the likelihood that an alien would face serious ostracism in her native
country due to her HIV-positive status and the lack of appropriate medical care for her
condition were sufficient to support the alien's claim for asylum"); IJ Grants Asylum,
supra note 157, at 901 (reporting that an immigration judge granted asylum based on
the applicant's HIV status, the testimony that "drugs to treat his illness are either scarce
or nonexistent" in his home country, and that HIV-positive people experience ostracism
based on their HIV status).
168. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text (discussing cases where US
courts denied relief).
169. lxtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 2007).
170. 219 F. App'x 879, 888 (11th Cir. 2007).
171. Id.
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the Philippines.172 The court did not address that portion of his
claim directly, but held that he failed to show a well-founded fear
of persecution based on his status as an HIV-positive
homosexual. 7 3
In granting asylum to a homosexual Mexican national in
Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered inadequate access to HIV/AIDS treatment,
but not in the context of determining whether the non-citizen
had been persecuted.174 In this case, the applicant testified that
while he was in Mexico, a police officer stopped him on nine
occasions over three months and forced him to perform oral sex
on the officer.175 The court held that sexual assault, including
forced oral sex, may constitute persecution, and, therefore, these
encounters rose to the level of persecution. 76 The burden then
shifted to the government to demonstrate that relocation within
Mexico was reasonable under the circumstances, and based on
inadequate medical care, the court found that the government
failed to meet its burden.'77 Boer-Sedano's doctor testified that
Boer-Sedano's AIDS was resistant to virtually all licensed AIDS
medications. 78 The medications the doctor prescribed to him
were investigational medications, which were unavailable in
Mexico even for purchase, and the doctor testified that Boer-
Sedano's condition would "rapidly deteriorate" without them.'79
Furthermore, the applicant demonstrated hostility towards and
discrimination against HIV/AIDS patients in Mexico, and
testified that his status as a homosexual with AIDS would make it
impossible to find a job to provide health insurance or funds
needed to import the drugs from elsewhere.180 Although some
asylum applicants have been successful on grounds related to lost
172. 244 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Petitioner claimed that medical treatment
for HIV is not available in the Philippines and that he has a well-founded fear of
persecution in that country.").
173. Id. ("[T]he BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals] found that Petitioner's
evidence showed nothing more than occasional discrimination and harassment, which
alone do not constitute persecution.").
174. Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005).
175. Id. at 1086.
176. Id. at 1088.
177. Id. at 1090-91.
178. Id. at 1091.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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HIV/AIDS treatment, the persecution requirement has
presented a considerable hurdle.181
C. Withholding ofRemoval
Like asylum law, withholding of removal protects non-US
citizens from persecution they may face if removed under the
Refugee Convention and the principle of non-refoulement.182
Under the withholding of removal statute, the US Attorney
General may not remove an alien to a country if she decides that
the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.'83 This standard is
similar to, but higher than, the standard under asylum law. 84
Application procedures for both legal protections are exactly the
same, and an application for asylum is automatically treated as an
application for withholding of removal. 85 Whether HIV/AIDS
status qualifies a non-US citizen for membership in a particular
social group under the withholding statute is not entirely clear.186
While the language of the withholding statute is broad,
"threat to life or freedom" is limited in its application to
181. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the persecution
requirement generally); see also supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text (discussing
cases in which removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment did not satisfy the persecution
requirement under asylum law).
182. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 892 (discussing asylum and
withholding of removal as two remedies potentially available to non-US citizens living in
the United States who seek protection from persecution); Hughes, supra note 14, at 253
("Withholding of removal under INA § 241(b) (3) implements US obligations of non-
refoulement under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention."); supra notes 161-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the persecution requirement tinder asylum law).
I83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3) (2006).
184. See Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The standard for
withholding of removal is more stringent than that for granting asylum."); see also Sylla v.
INS, 89 F. App'x 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that an alien who fails to establish
eligibility for asylum is unable to meet the more rigorous standard required for
withholding of removal).
185. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (2000) ("An asylum application shall be deemed to
constitute at the same time an application for withholding of removal, unless
adjudicated in deportation or exclusion proceedings commenced prior to April 1,
1997."); LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 892 ("[T]he application procedures
for the two remedies are exactly the same.").
186. See In re Argueta, 2003 WL, 23521910, at *2 (B.I.A. Nov. 14, 2003) ("We begin
by accepting for the purposes of argument the notion that persons living with AIDS in
Honduras constitute a 'social group' within the meaning of the Act.").
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withholding claims.'8 7 A 1978 US House of Representatives
Report stated that "the harm or suffering need not be physical,
but may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposition of
severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food,
housing, employment, or other essentials of life." 88 In order for
lack of life-saving medical care to qualify as threat to life or
freedom, the government of the receiving country must
deliberately withhold treatment,'89 and the lack of treatment
must be "the result of discrimination as opposed to general
economic strife applicable to the population at large." 90 The
requirement that treatment be deliberately withheld, and the
apparent indifference to lack of treatment resulting from poverty
rather than a human actor, generally precludes people from
availing themselves of the withholding protection where
HIV/AIDS treatment is unavailable in the home country.191
187. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (describing the parameters of
"threat to life or freedom" in the withholding statute).
188. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1452, at 5 (1978).
189. See Manani v. Filip, 552 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Manani has not shown
a clear probability that the Kenyan government, or private actors that the Kenyan
government is unable or unwilling to control, would deliberately deprive her of access to
life-sustaining medical care .... Nor has Manani shown that any inadequacies in Kenya's
health care system result from an effort to persecute persons diagnosed with HIV.");
lxtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding, in a case in which
the non-citizen testified that he was beaten by family members and raped by a neighbor
on account of his homosexuality, that his asylum and withholding claims should fail
because he "did not establish that the government was the source of his persecution or
that the government was unable or unwilling to control his attackers specifically, or,
more generally, those elements of society responsible for victimizing gay men").
190. In re Argueta, 2003 WIL 23521910, at *3 ("[T]he widespread poverty and
unemployment in Honduras make it difficult to conclude that the lack of medical and
economic resources that the respondent may face is the result of discrimination as
opposed to general economic strife applicable to the population at large.").
191. But see Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2008). The court remanded
where an immigration judge denied petitioner's withholding claim, which was based on
insuflicient medical treatment. Id. at 952. Petitioner testified that he would be
imprisoned upon his return to Nigeria under a law that provides for a five-year sentence
for "any Nigerian citizen found guilty in any foreign country of an offense involving
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances." Id. at 949. He submitted evidence that HIV-
infected prisoners in Nigeria lack access to doctors and medication, and that death rates
among that group are high. Id. The Seventh Circuit remanded, calling into question the
fairness of the proceedings before the Immigration Judge and whether they comported
with minimum due process standards. Id. at 951-52.
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D. Convention against Torture
The Convention against Torture is an international treaty
that the United States has ratified and implemented by statute.19 2
The aim of CAT is "to make more effective the struggle against
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world."'19 The United States ratified
CAT in 1990, subject to certain reservations and
understandings.19 4 The US Senate agreed to its ratification
subject to a declaration that it would not be self-executing.' 95 The
United States has implemented provisions of CAT by rules: 8
C.F.R. sections 208.16-208.18 and 1208.16-1208.18, and 22 C.F.R.
section 95.2.196
CAT and its enacting law forbid states from returning a
person to another country where there are substantial grounds
for believing that she would be in danger of being subjected to
192. See Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18
(2011); LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 1095-96 (stating that the United
Nations General Assembly adopted CAT in 1984, the United States ratified CAT in 1990,
and Congress passed the necessary implementing legislation in 1998).
193. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113
[hereinafter Convention against Torture].
194. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 1095-96 (stating that the
United States ratified CAT in 1990); 136 CONG. REC. 36198-99 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990)
(showing a number of reservations and declarations in the Senate's resolution of
ratification). Article 16 of CAT obligates state signatories to prevent acts of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment within its territories. Convention
against Torture, supra note 193, at 116. The Senate conditioned the United States'
ratification on limiting the country's obligations under Article 16 to conduct prohibited
by the US Constitution. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 25-26 (1990). While the
language of Article 16 is similar to that in Article 3 of the European Convention, the
Committee against Torture has held that "the aggravation of the condition of an
individual's physical or mental health by virtue of a deportation is generally insufficient,
in the absence of additional factors, to amount to degrading treatment in violation of
Article 16." Rep. of the Comm. against Torture, 41st sess, Nov. 3-21, 2008, 354, U.N.
Doc. A/64/44; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 44 (2009).
195. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, supra note 194, at 12 ("Although the terms of
the Convention, with the suggested reservations and understandings, are consonant with
US law, it is nevertheless preferable to leave any further implementation that may be
desired to the domestic legislative and judicial process.").
196. See Implementation of the Convention against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18; see
alsoMICHAELJOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
(CAT): OVERVIEW AN) APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 4-5 n.23 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32438.pdf (listing the statutes that
implement CAT in the United States).
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torture there.'97 Article 1 of CAT defines torture as "any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted."'98 US federal courts have held that
torture requires specific intent to accomplish a result, and mere
knowledge that one's act causes physical or mental suffering will
not suffice.'99 The Third Circuit has held that pain and suffering
due to lack of medical care does not satisfy the specific intent
requirement of torture and, therefore, does not fall under the
law enacting CAT.200 This holding implies that suffering due to
lack of HIV/AIDS treatment in the country to which a non-US
citizen suffering from H1V/AIDS is removed does not constitute
torture as defined by the law enacting CAT.201
Under the three US domestic laws discussed above, non-US
citizens with HIV/AIDS have had varying degrees of success in
contesting their removal on the basis of lost HIV/AIDS
treatment. 202 Claims of asylum on grounds of lost HIV/AIDS
treatment have been successful, but only when combined with
other factors. 203 The persecution requirement under asylum law
has proven to be another obstacle to claims based on lost
197. See Convention against Torture, supra note 193, at 114.
198. Id. at 113.
199. See Urquia-Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen., 372 F. App'x 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2010)
("Because we find that Urquia-Rodriguez failed to demonstrate specific intent, a
required showing in order to obtain relief under CAT ... Urquia-Rodriguez did not
meet her burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if
returned to Honduras."); Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2008)
("Mere knowledge that a result is substantially certain to follow from one's actions is not
sullicient to form the specific intent to torture.").
200. See Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189 (holding a Haitian national ineligible for relief
under the law enacting CAT based on the pain and suffering he would likely experience
in Haitian prison due to lack of medical treatment for his esophagus injury).
201. But see Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2008). Bosede's claim was
both under withholding and the law enacting CAT; remand was in response to both
claims. Id. at 948; see Jean-Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11 th Cir. 2007). jean-
Pierre claimed that he would "likely be tortured in a Haitian prison when his AIDS
infection, unchecked by life-saving medication, infects his mind and causes him to
behave inappropriately or erratically." Id. at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit remanded upon
a finding that the Board of Immigration Appeals, which denied Jean-Pierre's claim
under the law implementing CAT, failed to analyze the most important facts presented
in the case. Id. at 1326.
202. See supra Part II.1B-D. (outlining US case law of asylum, withholding, and the
law enacting CAT and the consequences on claimants whose removal will cut o1
HIV/AIDS treatment).
203. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (discussing claims of asylum
seekers with HIV/AIDS based on multiple factors).
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HIV/AIDS treatment. 2014 Withholding of removal requires a
threat to life or freedom that is deliberately inflicted, and results
from discrimination. 20 The law enacting CAT requires
intentionally-inflicted torture, which loss of medical care has
generally failed to meet.06
III. INADEQUACY OF US DOMESTIC PROTECTIONS AND
AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT
While domestic laws in the United States have protected
people with HIV/AIDS from removal in some circumstances,
each legal protection from removal is limited in its application to
people with HIV/AIDS who would lose access to life-sustaining
treatment.207 Section A concludes that present domestic legal
protections are inadequate for non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS in
the United States who would lose access to HIV/AIDS treatment
if removed. Section B discusses possible adaptations of US
domestic law that could provide a source of protection to non-US
citizens with HIV/AIDS whose removal would cut off their
HIV/AIDS treatment. Section C discusses sources of a new
protection from removal from the United States under
international law, including applying the American Declaration
consistently with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
case law, and recognizing an emerging legal protection from
removal under customary international law.
A. Limitations to US Domestic Law
No protection from removal in US domestic law speaks
directly to the loss of life-sustaining treatment that may result
from removal. 208 Asylum requires a well-founded fear of
persecution based on the applicant's membership in a suspect
204. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful asylum
claims).
205. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of the
threat to life or freedom under withholding law).
206. See supra notes 197-201 (discussing the intent requirement under the US law
implementing CAT, and its implications for applicants contesting removal that would
terminate HIV/AIDS treatment).
207. See infra Part III.A. (describing the limitations on US domestic law as applied
to removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
208. See supra Part II. (discussing cases in which the United States has protected
non-US citizens with HIV/AIIDS from removal).
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class.2 09 Lack of HIV/AIDS treatment in the receiving country
alone has never satisfied the persecution requirement. 210
Withholding, which requires a threat to life or freedom on the
basis of membership in a suspect class, is also inadequate.2 1' Loss
of medical treatment does not support a withholding claim
unless it results from discrimination or government action.212
Courts considering withholding claims have expressed
indifference to harm caused by loss of medical treatment that
results from poverty rather than from a human actor.213
Furthermore, as applied, the law enacting CAT fails to protect
non-US citizens from removal that terminates HIV/AIDS
treatment because it requires intentionally inflicted torture to
support a claim.214 Asylum, withholding, and the law enacting
CAT are too narrow to protect non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS
from removal that terminates life-sustaining HIV/AIDS
treatment.
Through the commitment of billions of dollars to PEPFAR,
the United States has demonstrated an interest in extending
access to HIV/AIDS treatment to more parts of the world. A
corollary of that interest should be an interest in ensuring
treatment to those non-US citizens presently receiving HIV/AIDS
treatment in the United States where facilities in the home
country are critically inadequate.2'5 The United States may
recognize a legal protection from removal that terminates
HIV/AIDS treatment by either adapting US domestic law to meet
209. See supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
asylum law and the corresponding standards of review).
210. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing asylum cases where
loss of medical care was a factor, but never the sole factor, in a successlul claim).
211. See supra Part II.C. (discussing claims of withholding applicants with
HIV/AIDS who would lose access to medical treatment if removed).
212. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (describing a case in which the
Board of Immigration Appeals withholding claim was unsuccessfil because the non-US
citizen failed to show that lack of medical treatment in his home country was
discriminatory, rather than the result of economic strife).
214. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing the intent
requirement of the law enacting CAT).
215. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing shortages of
HIV/AIDS treatment, and US measures to extend access to HIV/AIDS treatment
abroad).
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the need for such a protection, or implementing international
law.2'1
B. Solutions under US Domestic Law
While asylum, withholding, and the law enacting CAT in the
United States are currently inadequate to meet the needs of non-
US citizens with HIV/AIDS whose removal will end their life-
sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment, US courts or policymakers may
respond with law favorable to individuals in this position. The
aim of asylum and withholding is rooted in the principle of non-
refoulement, which prohibits returning people to countries where
they will face persecution.217 Courts have recognized persecution
and thus granted asylum claims based on lack of HIV/AIDS
treatment combined with ostracism.218 Asylum claims based on
lost HIV/ AIDS treatment alone, however, have never been
successful. While ostracism may be threatening, both socially and
emotionally and even perhaps physically, inadequate HIV/AIDS
treatment presents a physical threat that is likely to exceed the
threat of ostracism. Non-US citizens whose removal will terminate
their HIV/AIDS treatment should not have to demonstrate
ostracism in order to prevail. If social acceptance of people with
HIV/AIDS exceeds the progress of worldwide access to
HIV/AIDS treatment, thus reducing the occurrence of ostracism
of people with HIV/AIDS, asylum seekers may have more
difficulty preventing removal that will terminate treatment. US
courts or lawmakers may respond by expanding the concept of
persecution under asylum law to include life-threatening
termination of medical treatment. A change to withholding of
removal law in the United States may also protect non-US citizens
with HIV/AIDS from their life-threatening removal. The plain
meaning of the language in the withholding law, "threat to life or
freedom," seems amenable to a change that would allow
inclusion of termination of HIV/AIDS treatment.219 By relaxing
216. See infra Part IIIl-C. (discussing US options for protecting non-citizens with
HIV/AIDS from removal terminating treatment under US domestic and international
law).
217. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing non-refoulement).
218. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing successful US asylum
claims based on lack of medical care combined with ostracism).
219. See supra Part II.C. (discussing withholding of removal).
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the requirement that amenities be deliberately withheld or
motivated by discrimination in order to grant withholding claims,
US courts may protect non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS from
removal that will terminate life-sustaining treatment. 20
Arguing that lack of adequate medical care constitutes
torture under the law enacting CAT is more difficult, considering
both the plain language meaning of the word torture and
treatment of the term in US case law.221 The standard under
asylum law, however, is already easier to satisfy than the standard
under withholding of removal, and asylum claims based on
termination of HIV/AIDS treatment combined with ostracism
have been successful. A change in asylum law, accordingly, seems
to be the most feasible way the United States could adapt US
domestic law to protect non-citizens from removal terminating
needed HIV/AIDS treatment.
This raises the issue of what the parameters of a legal
protection from removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment
should be. The United States may, in remaining consistent with
D. v. United Kingdom, prohibit removal of an applicant in the
advanced stages of AIDS to a country with poor medical care and
lack of family support because it compromises her right to die
with dignity.2 2 A broader protection from removal may follow
the lead of Andrea Mortlock and prohibit removal that, because of
lack of family ties and medical care in the receiving country,
amounts to what applicants have called a "death sentence."223
In defining the parameters of a legal protection, the United
States should consider counterarguments to recognizing such a
protection, specifically, concerns of US national security and of
encouraging illegal immigration of non-US citizens with
HIV/AIDS who hope to secure treatment in the United States,
220. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (describing the requirement
under withholding law that amenities are deliberately withheld or motivated by
discrimination).
221. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of
torture under the law implementing CAT).
222. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of the
European Court of Human Rights in D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777
(1997)).
223. See supra note 27 (noting cases in which the petitioner alleged that her
removal amounted to a death sentence based on termination of HIV/AIDS treatment).
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never to be returned to their home countries. 224 A narrower
protection analogous to that in D. v. United Kingdom would
alleviate these concerns, as successful applicants will be in the
advanced stages of AIDS, arguably compromising their abilities
both to travel to the United States to seek protection, and to
threaten US national security. Other requirements may also
alleviate these concerns, including requiring a negative HIV
diagnosis during the non-citizen's residence in the United States,
or balancing the benefit to the non-citizen's life by prohibiting
their removal with the threat they present to US national
security.
Another, albeit less feasible, way to recognize a legal
protection is for US federal courts to revisit the issue of whether
removal may ever constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution.225 The
United States currently does not recognize protections from
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment in
removal proceedings.226 Research, however, has revealed no
claim under the cruel and unusual punishment clause that is
grounded in the argument that removal is likely to, or will,
hasten death.227 By analytically distinguishing the idea that
removal is punishment from the concept that removal that
hastens death is cruel and unusual punishment, US courts may
recognize an Eighth Amendment violation in certain, perhaps
extreme, circumstances. The US Supreme Court's posture on
removal as punishment in general is analytically distinguishable
from barring deportation that would cut off life-sustaining
HIV/AIDS treatment under a punishment rhetoric. To call the
act of deportation alone punishment is to say that requiring
someone to leave a country where she would like to stay is a
punitive measure the US government takes in response to the
224. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing US
counterarguments to the recognition of a new or extended protection from removal).
225. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
226. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing US federal case law on
removal as punishment and application of the Eighth Amendment to removal
proceedings).
227. But see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing the US
government's position in Mortlock that removal does not constitute punishment even
here, where the claimant argued her removal may be fatal).
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non-US citizen's criminal act. As the US Supreme Court stated in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime ...
It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country
of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon
the performance of which the government ... has
determined that his continuing to reside here shall
depend.228
In the case of HIV/AIDS infections, deportation is
distinguishable because not only does it enforce a non-citizen's
return to her home country because she has not complied with
the requirements of legal immigration status, but because her
removal would directly result in the loss of life sustenance and
would thus constitute what non-citizens in this position have
called a "death sentence."229 US courts should recognize an
exception where non-citizens successfully argue that their
removal amounts to a death sentence.
C. Solutions under International Law
The United States may remedy the inadequate legal
protections for non-US citizens with HIV/AIDS by looking to
international law standards. The European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
have both recognized legal protections from removal based on
termination of HIV/AIDS treatment under the European
Convention and the American Declaration, respectively. 230 The
United States may recognize a similar protection through the
lens of the American Declaration, which under Article XXVI
prohibits cruel, infamous, and unusual punishment.23' By
applying the American Declaration consistently with the Inter-
American Commission in the Andrea Mortlock case, the United
228. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); see supra note 10
(discussing Fong Yue Ting v. United States).
229. See supra note 27 (noting cases in which the petitioner claimed her removal
amounted to a death sentence); see also supra notes 124-30 (implying that the court
found that Mortlock's removal amounted to a death sentence).
230. See supra Part 1.B--E. (discussing the European Convention, the American
Declaration, and case law in which the European Court ol Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights recognized a protection from removal
terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
231. See American Declaration, supra note 50, at art. XXV.
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States may protect a non-citizen from removal that would
terminate HIV/AIDS treatment and therefore hasten death.232
The United States' posture on cruel and unusual
punishment as applied to removal proceedings complicates this
solution. Under US law, deportation is not punishment for a
crime, and therefore, the United States will not recognize
removal as cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment. 3
Furthermore, US Courts of Appeals have held that the cruel and
unusual punishment clause under the Eighth Amendment does
not protect non-citizens from removal.234 In order to employ a
legal protection from removal under Article XXVI of the
American Declaration, and leave intact the United States'
position on removal as punishment, the United States may
execute Article XXVI with a law that uses narrower language.
Such a law could prohibit, for example, removal of a non-citizen
that would hasten death by means of the non-citizen's terminal
illness in combination with the termination of access to
treatment that would result from removal. This may or may not
be limited to cases where the terminal illness is HIV/AIDS. While
this Note focuses on termination of HIV/AIDS treatment,
protecting people from removal that terminates life-sustaining
treatment for any illness is obviously desirable in the interest of
saving lives of non-US citizens living on US soil.
The United States may also recognize an emerging
protection from removal in customary international law.235 In
Andrea Mortlock, the Inter-American Commission protected a
woman from her effectively life-ending removal under the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the American Declaration.236
In D. v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
reached the same outcome by recognizing a right to be free from
232. See supra text accompanying note 58 (providing the language of Article XXVI
of the American Declaration); see also Part I.E. (discussing the Andrea Mortlock case).
233. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing US federal case law
surrounding removal as punishment in general).
234. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing US federal case law on
applicability of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to
removal proceedings).
235. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing customary
international law and its applications in US domestic courts).
236. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text (identifying Mortlock's claim
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Commission's
holding).
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cruel and unusual punishment and treatment.2 7 The United
States does not recognize either right in removal proceedings.238
Customary international law, furthermore, is only binding where
no executive or legislative act orjudicial opinion controls.239 One
may argue that US federal case law, which has asserted that
removal does not constitute punishment, precludes application
of customary international law on this issue. 240 Conversely,
however, the United States may recognize a legal protection from
removal under customary international law, consistent with
Andrea Mortlock and D. v. United Kingdom, which does not rely on
the cruel and unusual punishment rhetoric that US courts have
rejected in the removal proceedings context, and does not have
the broad legal implications that such rhetoric entails.241
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights
coupled with the Andrea Mortlock case raises doubts about the
parameters of the protection that may be emerging in customary
international law. 24 2 In D. v. United Kingdom and N. v. United
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights defined a
protection from removal that would exacerbate a non-citizen's
already serious terminal illness in its advanced stages, thus
compromising the non-citizen's right to die with dignity.2 43 The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' decision in
Andrea Mortlock recognized a broader protection from removal
237. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing the claim in D. v.
United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997), and the European Court of Human
Rights' ruling).
238. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing US treatment of the
Eighth Amendment in removal proceedings).
239. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the status of customary
international law in US federal law).
240. See supra note II and accompanying text (discussing US federal case law on
removal as punishment).
241. See supra Part 1.B-E. (discussing international jurisprudence and the
document provisions under which international legal bodies have recognized
protections from removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
242. See supra Part 1.C-E. (discussing D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
777 (1997), N v. United Kingdom,[GC], App. No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), and
Mordock, Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/08, (2008)).
243. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in D. v.
United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997), and noting that it stands for the right
to die with dignity); see also supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing the
European Court of Human Rights' rationale for denying relief in N. v. United Kingdom,
[GC], App. No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), and distinguishing that case from D. v.
United Kingdom, 1997-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (1997)).
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that turns not on the gravity of the prognosis but on the fact that
removal terminates life-sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment and thus
may well be fatal.24 4 The United States may enact a statute that
specifies the scope and standard of the legal protection that the
United States wishes to provide.245
The United States has several options in protecting non-US
citizens with HIV/AIDS from removal that will terminate
HIV/AIDS treatment. In addition to recognizing such a removal
as a violation of US asylum, withholding, or CAT laws, the United
States may utilize international laws in recognizing a new
protection.24 6 This may entail applying the American Declaration
consistently with the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, or recognizing a right under
customary international law. 24 7 As Andrea Mortlock demonstrates,
the punishment rubric has proven problematic in protecting
non-citizens in the United States from removal in even the most
extreme cases.248 The finding by the US Supreme Court that
removal does not constitute punishment has disastrous
consequences here, and the United States must find a way
around that position to prevent removal that is effectively a death
sentence.
CONCLUSION
That a woman in Andrea Mortlock's position could fall
through the cracks in US domestic immigration law and be
condemned to death in her home country is appalling. That her
death would result from an absence of adequate medical care
244. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (discussing the parameters of
the legal protection which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
recognized in Andrea Mortlock, and the standard of review the Commission applied).
245. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (discussing concerns and
interests that the United States should consider in defining the parameters of a
protection from removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
246. See supra Part Ill.B. (discussing protections from removal that the United
States may recognize under US domestic law); Part IlI.C. (discussing protections based
on international law).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 230-45 (discussing US ratification of the
American Declaration, and customary international law as a source of protection from
removal terminating HIV/AIDS treatment).
248. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing the US
government's position in Andrea Mortlock that removal does not constitute punishment
even here, where the claimant argued her removal may be fatal).
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rather than from a human actor does not change the result for
Mortlock upon her return to her home country, and should not
change the result when she seeks legal protection from removal
on those grounds in the United States. The United States should
protect non-US citizens from removal in circumstances such as
those in Andrea Mortlock, that is to say, where removal will
terminate life-sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment and hasten death.
The United States may do this by adapting US domestic laws to
prohibit removal that terminates HIV/AIDS treatment, or by
recognizing an Eighth Amendment protection in removal
proceedings that seriously endanger a life. Alternatively, the
United States may apply the American Declaration consistently
with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights decision
in Andrea Mortlock, or recognize an emerging customary
international law that prohibits removal terminating life-
sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment.
